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A Tribute to Romualdo Abulad, the Filipino Kantian

Pilosopiyang Pinoy: Uso Pa Ba?
(The Relevance of Filipino Philosophy in
Social Renewal)1
Romualdo E. Abulad†

Abstract: This paper evaluates the titular question and features a
summative evaluation and critique of the works and contributions of
Leonardo Mercado, Dionisio Miranda, Albert Alejo, Rolando Gripaldo
(1947-2017), and Florentino Timbreza to the anthropological and
cultural approaches that form a significant part of the discourses on
Filipino philosophy. In this piece, Abulad maintains, as in his other
writings, that any strict emphasis with regard to methodology restricts
the true potential of Filipino philosophy. He buttresses this assertion
by invoking postmodernism's 'incredulity towards metanarratives' We
should be skeptical about the metanarrative of Filipino identity for it is
precisely our rootlessness that defines us. Towards the end, he cites
Emerita Quito's openness as a distinct philosophical attitude that had
made her, to-date, unsurpassable. This remarkable trait, for Abulad,
should inspire us to welcome the new: with the “collapse of borders
and the merger of horizons,” it would serve us well to continuously
rethink the role of philosophy.
Keywords: Filipino philosophy, anthropological approach, cultural
approach, postmodernity

W

hen I accepted your invitation for me to speak at your annual
Regional Philosophy Gathering, what attracted me mainly was the
intriguing theme of your celebration: “Pilosopiyang Pinoy:
Uso pa ba?” Uso pa ba ang Pilosopiyang Pinoy? Actually, my suspicion is what
you’d like to ask is really a more general question: Uso pa ba ang Pilosopiya?
The specific reference to Filipino Philosophy makes the situation even worse.
1 Editor’s note: An early version of this piece was presented in the 10 th Philosophical
Conference of the Sancta Maria Mater et Regina Seminarium, Archdiocese of Capiz, Roxas City,
18-20 November 2010. We would like to thank Preciosa de Joya of the Department of Philosophy,
Ateneo de Manila University, for graciously supplying us with an early copy of the manuscript.
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Its implication is that there is such a thing as “pilosopiyang Pinoy,” and the
question being asked is only whether it is still relevant: uso pa ba? But the
assumption is itself a question deserving to be asked: Mayroon bang
Pilosopiyang Pinoy? Ano ba ito? Only after having satisfied this latter question
(Ano ba ang Pilosopiyang Pinoy?) will it be meaningful to ask about its
relevance, if at all. In a philosophical discussion, we might as well not assume
anything, or else we might find ourselves deeply in trouble later.
And so, let me begin by asking the assumed question: Is there a
Filipino philosophy? And the proof for a positive answer to it can only be
found in the actual articulation of it. Without this articulation, it will be
difficult even to show that there is such a thing as a Filipino philosophy.
Maybe, in the first place, we are talking about nothing. At this point, indeed,
it would be better not to assume anything and so we need to ask: Is there a
Filipino philosophy?
We need to give credit to whom it is due, and we must yield to
Leonardo Mercado the right to claim to have consciously written the first
book on Filipino Philosophy. His Elements of Filipino Philosophy (1974), though
not impeccable, is a landmark work. What he says in the Preface is not
inaccurate: “This pioneering work is the first systematic attempt to present
the philosophy of the Filipino masses.” 2 This doesn’t mean that Mercado is
the first Filipino philosopher, only that he is the first Filipino philosopher to
have tried to present a systematic philosophy which he conceived to be a
‘philosophy of the Filipino masses.’ There are two things to notice here: first
is that Mercado claims to have presented a ‘systematic philosophy’ and
second is that this philosophy is that of the ‘Filipino masses’ or the ‘common
tao.’ He justifies this claim by stating that his method involves “an analysis of
Philippine languages” and “a phenomenology of Filipino behavior.” He
further elucidates this in Chapter I where he describes as ‘holistic’ his
methodology3 which consists of ‘metalinguistic analysis’ and
‘phenomenology of behavior,’ neither of which is, to be frank, indigenously
Filipino. In a previous work, I described this method of Mercado as
‘anthropological,’4 and it is no accident that among the prominent authors
mentioned here are Claude Levi-Strauss and Emile Durkheim,5 as well
Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir.6 As to phenomenology, the ones
2 See Leonardo N. Mercado, Preface to Elements of Filipino Philosophy (Tacloban City:
Divine Word University Publications, 1993).
3 Ibid., 8.
4 In the textbook I prepared for the Philosophy Department of the De La Salle, I
mentioned in the Introduction three philosophical options for a Filipino philosophy: expository,
anthropological, and progressive. See Readings in Filipino Philosophy (Manila: De La Salle
University, 1990), 4 passim.
5 Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy, 12.
6 Ibid., 42-43.
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featured most are Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty,7 without
excluding the other philosophers of language such as Ludwig Wittgenstein I
and II8 and the analytic philosophers. This makes phenomenology and
analysis rather apt descriptions of his method which, however, cannot really
qualify as something indigenously Filipino. The anthropological approach,
after all, is universally accepted, and my suggestion is that it cannot be this
which makes Mercado’s philosophy Filipino. It is also a question when an
anthropologist, not a philosopher, could have been the more qualified expert
to undertake this.
If not the anthropological approach, what makes Mercado a uniquely
Filipino philosopher? Perhaps the answer has to do with the object of his
studies, namely, Filipino languages and Filipino behavior. A prominent
feature of his work is the tables of intellectual, volitional, emotional and
ethical themes comparing the Visayan, Tagalog, Ilocano and the English
languages in their use of the concept of “loob/buot/nakem.”9 This would have
been an impressive contribution to both philosophy and anthropology if the
scope of this magnitude were given by the author the thorough treatment that
it deserves. The chapters not only on loob/buot/nakem but also on the verbs,
kinship, time, space, causality, private property, law, and religion were too
brief to be credibly anthropologically exhaustive. In the end, the reader has
to be satisfied with the following conclusion, that, negatively, the Filipino’s
worldview is “non-dualistic,” “non-compartment-alized,” and “nonlinear.”10 None of these concepts is original, for they describe as well the other
Oriental philosophies which go for man’s natural harmony and goodness. 11
If this is the philosophy of the ‘common tao,’ then that ‘common tao’ must be
Chinese and Indian as well. The picture that emerges at the end of his study
is the stereotype of an Oriental and one is left to wonder if this stereotype did
not in fact came ahead of his investigation and methodology.
I am not sure I know of a solid disciple of Mercado who actually
swears by everything he does methodologically and philosophically. His
latest work, Explorations in Filipino Philosophy,12 is a worthy companion but
does not exceed the first work, Elements of Filipino Philosophy—the latter
remains as his most important work. The multi-volume that would have
made the opus of Mercado classic and immortal had not materialized, and
the actual work is perhaps better done by anthropologists than by

Ibid., 11, also 18-27.
Ibid., 27-40.
9 Ibid., 55-64.
10 Ibid., 191-192.
11 Ibid., 193 (on the orientality of Filipino philosophy).
12 Leonardo N. Mercado, Explorations in Filipino Philosophy (Manila: Logos Publications,
7
8

2009).
© 2019 Romualdo E. Abulad
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_25/abulad1_december2019.pdf
ISSN 1908-7330

R. ABULAD

19

philosophers. This does not mean, however, that the anthropological
approach has no adherents among Filipino philosophers; indeed, Mercado
remains the pioneer in this work for which he will be remembered. Let me
now randomly go through some of our philosophers who, consciously or not,
are using the method of anthropology.
I would like to give attention to another philosopher who, like
Mercado, is a Catholic missionary. They are both my confreres,13 but that’s
not the reason why I am here singling them out. The reason is rather that they
have both done remarkably well in the field of scholarship which they have
chosen to take part in. There is no doubt that, of the two, Dionisio Miranda is
the more thorough and exhaustive writer, perhaps also the more articulate
and original one. He makes no bones about his engagement with culture
which he defines “in its most generic meaning as the conceptualizing of
reality and responding to the same which persons learn as members of a
social group.”14 Unlike Mercado, Miranda admits his “limited experience” 15
in the area of inculturation, which makes even more for the credibility of his
project. “My own proposal for methodical inculturation in the area of
philosophical and theological inculturation,” he declares, “consists basically
of a two-pronged approach to the culture issue. Those prongs are
indigenization and contextualization.” 16
This makes Miranda’s approach concrete and, despite his academic
eloquence, never merely an armchair and ivory-tower intellectual exercise.
He stays consistently on the level of his own understanding of inculturation,
that it “cannot prescind from a discussion of concrete society that must
ultimately undertake it. Inculturation is ultimately a discourse about society
itself.”17 Interestingly, he considers it “imperative for inculturation to be selfconscious and critical of itself and its own projects.” 18 And, in the case of the
Philippines, he contends that “authentic inculturation cannot ignore the
majority poor as its chief responsibility and resource.”19 Thus, Miranda wisely
avers that inculturation “is not an abstract idea; it is a practical process that
occurs in the concrete.” 20 He situates his interest unambiguously in Filipino
13 Editor’s note: Abulad, Mercado, and Miranda are members of the Societas Verbi
Divini (SVD).
14 Dionisio M. Miranda, Buting Pinoy: Probe Essays on Value as Filipino (Manila: Divine
Word Publications, 1992), 6. However, the biographical note on the back cover of the book says
that he has been on the council of the SVD Philippine Central Province since 1987. The book must
have been written, then, after that year, more than a decade after Mercado’s Elements was first
printed.
15 Ibid., 10.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 15.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 16.
20 Ibid., 19.
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culture with a particular professional focus on “the specific cultural processes
and interactions … that bear on the field of ethics in both the philosophical
and theological variants.”21 Still, he defines his area of engagement within
“fundamental and/or general moral theology” and argues that there will
always be a need too for theoreticians with long-term commitment “who will
appear to have little immediate relevance.”22
Where Miranda comes close, albeit unconsciously, to Mercado can be
gleaned from the spirit of the following text:
Culture, especially the indigenous, is as intimate as skin;
it is not like a vestment that can be casually disrobed …
But there is a change that is possible and desirable: it is
to recover the original self and reshape it in more
authentic ways. That is radicality in its true sense: to
return to the roots of being and existence, to recover the
originality of culture and the creativity of history.23
One can sense the same missionary zeal in the preoccupation of both
philosophers of the Filipino culture, but Miranda is the one more clearly
aware of the radicality of even a proposed Filipino theory which “is not to be
merely one more conception whose only value lies in its local color or
folkloristic aspects.”24
In this small essay I cannot even attempt to cover the whole intent of
Miranda’s ambitious project. Enough to say that his inquiry attempts to cover
socio-cultural data as the source of his notion of value. For him the
philosophical question is: “what is implied in the notion of value culled from
the social-cultural data?”25 Interestingly, again sounding altogether like
Mercado, he describes the first step of his approach to the philosophy of
culture as “that of phenomenological description” whose task is “to delineate
the basic constituent elements of Filipino morality.” 26 This
“phenomenological analysis” is then followed by “constructive analysis” on
the ethos level and the “critical analysis” on the ethics level.27 Somewhat like
Mercado, he goes linguistic in what he calls the “search for a Tagalog name”
for the English ‘value,’ thus describing his approach as “terminological-

Ibid.
Ibid., 20.
23 Ibid., 22.
24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., 36.
26 Ibid., 37.
27 Ibid., 37-39.
21
22
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conceptual” and “conceptual-terminological” to be completed in a more
“dialectical approach” that eventually arrives at “buting Pinoy.”28
Loob is a favorite concept of investigation among those who use the
anthropological approach, granting of course its variants.29 One book
exclusively written on it is Albert E. Alejo’s Tao pô! Tulóy!, subtitled Isang
Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao.30 Written wholly in Tagalog, one of its
revealing features is the chapter where he presents various writers on loob,
which includes philosophers like Leonardo Mercado and Roque Ferriols, but
mostly historians like Emmanuel Lacaba, Zeus Salazar, Reynaldo Ileto, and
Vicente Rafael.31 Alejo explains his title: “Ang unang bahagi ay tinaguriang
‘TAO PO!’ dahil para tayong naghahanap ng landas patungo sa loob … Sa ikalawang
bahagi, tila pinapayagan tayong makapasok sa loob kaya nga ang salubong sa atin ay
‘TULOY!’”32 My surmise is he initially hopes to be able to complete the
description of the Filipino loob, inside and out, and thus coming up finally
with a definitive account of the Filipino identity. In the end, Alejo knows he
succeeds in doing something less than that. “Wala akong nalikhang
depinisyon.”33 He adds, “Hindi ito, kung sa bagay, ang aking intensyon.” There
seems to be a sense of frustration here, buoyed up only by his promise to
himself that there are more works to come. “Kaya’t sa aking pananaw, ang
paglitaw ng sanaysay na ito ay isa lamang pasinaya sa marami pang darating.”34 It
doesn’t seem like this promise has been fulfilled, nor is this fact something
we should deplore. I would rather take this seeming failure of Alejo’s
enterprise as precisely an essential part of his main contribution to Filipino
philosophy, so that it becomes something which no one needs to undertake
again. Perhaps without his being conscious of it, he is actually only repeating,
albeit in an indigenous way, what even in the West spells a dead-end.
The loob is not really a Filipino discovery. It is equivalent to the
Socratic self, as in “Know thyself!” 35 It is the Greek psyche,
Aristotle’s anima or soul which is the inner essence or form, the counterpart

Ibid., 48-59.
For Mercado’s discussion of “loob,” see Elements of Filipino Philosophy, 53-71; also,
The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II (Manila: The Council for Research in Values
and Philosophy and Divine Word Publications, 1994), 19-37. For Miranda, see Buting Pinoy, 124130.
30 Albert E. Alejo, Tao pô! Tuloy! Isang Landas ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao (Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University Office of Research and Publications, 1990).
31 See ibid., Chapter 2.
32 Ibid., ix.
33 Ibid., 117.
34 Ibid., 116.
35 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by R. Hackforth, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. by Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 230a.
28
29
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of the external body or matter.36 This is also the Geist of German Idealism
culminating in the Absolute Spirit after its long and laborious journey which
Hegel calls its phenomenology.37 One might say that Hegel is more successful
than Alejo in that at least the former was able to construct what could be
described as the greatest system ever conceived by the Mind. However, we
all know that this Absolute of Hegel is precisely the model for the
metanarrative which later philosophers would love to explode and
deconstruct.38 Moreover, the fact that Alejo discovers in the end the emptiness
of the loob he wants to explore is most likely indicative of his captivity,
perhaps unconscious, in the dualism normally attributed to Western
philosophy between external and internal, object and subject, contents and
thoughts. We’re here back to the Cartesian tension between mind and body,
of course with a flavor that is Alejo’s own.
One should not take this critique of Alejo as pejorative. That I
compare his achievement to such greats as Socrates, Descartes and Hegel is
enough to prove that I don’t mean to hurt anyone’s philosophical project.
Philosophy, like any other academic discipline, thrives on the criticisms of
those within the circle of our profession. We challenge each other until we are
able to see the light of day for the work we wish to leave behind.
Another Filipino philosopher whom I would count, along with
Mercado, Miranda and even Alejo, as mainly anthropological is Rolando
Gripaldo. This is not to mean that they are doing exactly the same work.
Gripaldo will revolt against any insinuation to that effect; he would cringe at
the thought of being placed side by side with, say, Mercado and Timbreza.
He admits that a “cultural rethinking of Filipino philosophy is important, but
it should be a philosophical reflection of our existing culture as a whole or of
our individual cultural traits.”39 This is the sense in which we take him to fall
under our anthropological label; I don’t mean much more. He would rather
take the meaning of Filipino philosophy, with his own presumably as an
example, as something profound and substantial. “The important thing in
philosophizing,” he says, “is not simply tangential philosophical reflections

36 Aristotle’s theory of hylemorphism is found in De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith, in The
Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 412b10-13.
37 Hegel describes the phenomenology of mind or the ‘gradual development of
knowing’ as a “long and laborious journey (that) must be undertaken.” See G.W.F. Hegel,
Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 88.
38 See Jean-Francoiş Lyotard’s postmodern critique of metanarratives in The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Beoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993). See also Jacques Derrida’s famous theory of
deconstructionism, for instance in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Blass (Brighton, Sussex:
The Harvester Press, 1982).
39
Rolando M. Gripaldo, The Making of a Filipino Philosopher and Other
Essays (Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 2009), 70.
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but substantial philosophical innovativeness that could have ramifications in
the philosophical world.”40 “What we need are philosophical innovations that
are distinctively the product of profound philosophical minds, something
that will separate one’s thoughts from the thoughts of others before him or
her,” Gripaldo continues, “and I think this is one of the great challenges of a
would-be Filipino philosopher.”41 He thinks that we need already “to
graduate from (the) kind of piecemeal analysis” which our country’s thinkers
are wont to indulge in.
Gripaldo justifies his own philosophical training. “My background in
Western philosophy and my studies in Oriental philosophy were enough
training and material to know what to look for in the writings of Filipino
thinkers,” is how he judges himself. “Moreover,” he says, “a good working
background on Western and Eastern thought is also generally important in
becoming a world-class philosopher.”42 “Do I have a philosophy of my
own?,” he asks. “The answer is affirmative,” and he dares to answer his own
question, admitting simultaneously however that “I have not yet written it in
one book.” He continues to promise, “in due time, I intend to write a volume
or two about my own comprehensive systematic philosophy. After all,
our task is to make ourselves philosophers, not just teachers or scholars of
philosophy.”43 When I read this, I could not help being reminded of another
great teacher, Confucius, who said something opposite to what has just been
said by Gripaldo: “I transmit but do not create. I believe in and love the
ancients.”44 “A man who reviews the old so as to find out the new is qualified
to teach others.”45
Gripaldo dreams “to situate Filipino philosophy in world history” 46
and sadly takes note that our making a dint in world philosophy circles “is
virtually zero.”47 “In the World Congress on Mulla Sadra held in Tehran in
1999, I was the only Filipino there who read a paper on the theory of speech
acts,” Gripaldo laments, “I was the only Filipino who presented a paper in
the American Philosophical Association Conference held in December 2006
in Washington, D.C.”48 One wonders whether it was his trip beyond Greece
which made Plato such a great philosopher.

Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 70.
42 Ibid., 73.
43 Ibid.
44 Confucius, The Analects, trans. by Wing-tsit Chan, in A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 7:1.
45 Ibid., 2:11.
46 Gripaldo, The Making of a Filipino Philosopher and Other Essays, 73.
47 Ibid., 74.
48 Ibid.
40
41
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Perhaps still the best work of Gripaldo is his early work,
Circumstantialism (1977).49 But this little work has for its thesis clearly
articulated already on its first page, and the rest of the booklet says nothing
much more.
What will be demonstrated in this essay is the thesis that
the alleged free choice is not free at all in that there are
always some subtle influencing factors or reasons which
determine, in the sense of giving direction or tendency
to, the choice … of the individual such that this choice
stands out as the only alternative fitting or appropriate
in that situation.50
This variant of the philosophy of determinism is what Gripaldo calls
“situational determinism” or, as the title of his booklet calls it,
“circumstantialism.” It is “something like a hybrid between the ethical and
the psychological types of determinism.” 51 “It is by virtue of the complex
reasons for the choosing act that the best in the situation relative to the agent’s
values or purposes is laid bare.”52 There is certainly nothing yet here which
can pass the requirements Gripaldo lays down for a great Filipino
philosophy. Although we have here something more than a ‘piecemeal
analysis,’ it does seem that we will have to wait for more uncertain years
before we will see the promised great work on paper. It is probably this
circumstantialism of Gripaldo that allows for his contextualization of Filipino
philosophy. He is conscious of his coming from the signposts of his
contemporaries, but also from those of the great Filipino personalities
illustrated on the cover of his 2009 collection of essays, The Making of a Filipino
Philosopher and Other Essays. His message is well-taken, but it remains
anybody’s guess whether the great work will or can be written after all.53
Florentino Timbreza is another Filipino philosopher who is trying
hard to deserve the title while sourcing materials from all sorts of influences,
Eastern and Western. Many of his works are also articulated in Tagalog, the
main local language. He has this to say:
Hindi lamang ang mga dayuhan – ang mga Griyego,
Amerikano, Intsik o Kastila ang may karanasan. Ang lahing

49

Rolando M. Gripaldo, Circumstantialism (Dumaguete City: Silliman University Press,

1977).
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 112.
52 Ibid.
53 Editor’s note: Gripaldo died in 2017.
50
51
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Kayumanggi ay may natatanging karanasan din na
singyaman at singdakila nga karanasan ng ibang mga lahi.
Isa pa, kung ang pilosopiya ay nababatay sa mga
pandaigdigang pananaw na angat sa tunay na karanasan sa
buhay, pinatutunayan nito na mayroong pilosopiyang
Pilipino, sapagkat mayroon din namang natatangi’t
katutubong pag-iisip at mga pandaigdigang pananaw ng mga
Pilipino na batay sa likas nilang karanasan sa buhay.54
It is this attempt to draw a universal philosophy from the particular and
specific experiences of the Filipinos which makes Timbreza a philosopher
using the anthropological approach. To Gripaldo, this might be ‘piecemeal’
and, like in Mercado’s case, the voluminous and thorough treatment of the
subject has yet to see the light of day. What, in fact, Timbreza would like to
do is as follows:
… sinikap na pinagsama-sama, pinag-ugnay-ugnay at
pinagtugma-tugma ang mga salawikain at mga kasabihan ng
mga mamamayang naninirahan sa mga pangunahing pook ng
kapuluan: Tagalog, Ilokano, Ivatan, Pampanggao, Bisaya,
Tiruray, Tausug, Maranao, Maguindanao, Aklano,
Bukidnon, Subuanon, Zambaleno, Romblomanon, Kinaray-a,
Waray, Kalinga-Banao.55
Each chapter is supposed to do that on a particular area supposedly an
element of the Filipino consciousness, the “diwang Pilipino.” That’s a tall
order, and a short 148-page work cannot be expected to satisfy the ambitious
goal, perhaps more appropriately for an anthropologist than for a
philosopher.
Perhaps an even better work of Timbreza is the one produced by De
La Salle University in 1999 before his retirement as a teacher there,
appropriately titled Intelektwalisasyon ng Pilosopiyang Filipino. He minces no
words about his expectation of ourselves as Filipino philosophers:
Dapat tayong mag-isip ng sarili nating pag-iisip at hindi ang
pag-iisip ng iba. Tayo ay mamilosopiya ng sarili nating
pilosopiya at hindi ang pilosopiya ng ibang lahi. Sinumang
namimilosopiya sa pamamagitan ng pilosopiya ng ibang tao
ay walang sariling pilosopiya. Sinumang nasisiyahan na mag-

54
55

Florentino T. Timbreza, Pilosopiyang Pilipino (Manila: Rex Book Store, 1982), 2.
Ibid., 8.
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isip sa pamamagitan ng pag-iisip ng iba ay salat sa sariling
pag-iisip.56
This is what he calls his “challenge” (hamon) to his fellow philosophers.
Hanggang kailan tayo mananatiling bilanggo ng pag-iisip ng
iba? Bakit hindi natin gamitin an gating sariling pag-iisip?
Bakit pa tayo paaalipin sa pilosopiya ng ibang tao
samantalang kaya naman nating mamilosopiya sa ating sarili
mismo? Ito ang pangalawang hamon ng librong ito sa bawat
Filipino na mayroong wagas na pagmamahal sa kanyang
tunay na pagkatao.57
It is in response to this challenge that he proposes the “intellectualization of
Filipino philosophy.” This intellectualization process of Filipino philosophy
goes through five phases: “(1) pagsasalin, (2) konseptwalisasyon, (3)
interpretasyon o pagpapakahulugan, (4) paghahambing, at (5) repleksyon o
pagmumuni.”58 For a philosopher who seems to be aiming at something
purely indigenous, Timbreza is unabashedly coming from a translation and
a re-conceptualization of the Chinese philosopher, Lao Tzu. He ends up
comparing Lao Tzu’s wise sayings with those of the Ilokano, Tagalog,
Ilonggo, Cebuano, Tausug, Tiruray, Pampanggo, Boholano, Ivatan,
Maguindanao and Maranao.59 For this purpose, his 230 pages cannot be said
to be sufficiently long enough; it remains, in Gripaldo’s vocabulary,
‘piecemeal.’
The setback of the anthropological approach for a philosopher is the
fact that it might as well have been undertaken by professional
anthropologists themselves, not by philosophers. Claude Levi-Strauss is a
case in point of a trained anthropologist who is so good at his craft that he
inevitably finds his way back to its philosophical source. 60 It is philosophy

56 Florentino T. Timbreza, Intelektwalisasyon ng Pilosoiyang Filipino (Manila: De La Salle
University Press, Inc., 1999), xi.
57 Ibid., xii.
58 Ibid., 3.
59 Ibid., e.g. 31-33, 46-48, and so on. Each chapter follows this methodology, which is
really no different from the methodology used in Pilosopiyang Pilipino. The same criticism may
be therefore be labeled on this new work.
60 Claude Levi-Strauss’s rigorous anthropological writings are saturated through and
through with philosophic discipline, he writes: “But what confers upon kinship its socio-cultural
character is not what it retains from nature, but, rather, the essential way in which it diverges
from nature. A kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity
between individuals. It exists only in human consciousness; it is an arbitrary system of representations,
not the spontaneous development of a real situation.” Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire
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that gives depth to his anthropology, but a philosophy which is not conscious
of itself, conscious only of the fact that it is trying to break as profoundly as
possible through the surface of kinship and other social relationships. This
requires meticulous description of the phenomena under study, which is why
Levi-Strauss’ works can at times be technical and laborious, if not
voluminous.
Perhaps the anthropological approach, called by Gripaldo the
cultural approach,61 should better left to trained anthropologists. What a
number of our Filipino philosophers are trying to do shows somewhat
frustrated efforts to hurry into profound conclusions on the basis of random
and rambling empirical data. The upside of it is that it becomes clear thereby
that anthropology, like all the other sciences, hide philosophical
underpinnings, without which a scientific or cultural insight rings hollow, if
not shallow. Anthropology needs philosophy if it is to show any amount of
rigorous discipline and insight. But all this should not be construed as
meaning that philosophers can dabble in anthropology as well as
anthropologists themselves. Yet, the combination is profound, but its
masterpiece is yet to be written by a Filipino philosopher.
Perhaps the fate of some brilliant colleagues of ours in San Beda can
teach us a lesson or two about the appropriate place of cultural and
anthropological scholarship in the academic scheme of things. It might well
be reasonable, after all, that such bright proponents as F.P.A. Demeterio and
his group had to see the closure of their department and their eventual
relocation in the area of Philippine Studies of the De La Salle University.
What seems to be the present state of affairs is not necessarily
tantamount to the demise of the anthropological or cultural approach, whose
first great work in philosophy we might not yet have seen. But, after all that
has so far been said and done, it can certainly safely be said already that this
is not the only way, perhaps not even the best way, of doing Filipino
philosophy. Perhaps, I dare to say, it might not even be a wrong strategy to
consciously do Filipino philosophy, but only as a way of reviewing what so
far our Filipino philosophers have done and assessing whether there has been
anything substantial that has already come out of their effort. Even this might
not be too wise to undertake yet, since we are still too close to our writers to
Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 48-49,
emphasis mine.
61 Gripaldo, Making of a Filipino Philosopher, 1-8, also 41-42. At one point, Gripaldo
minces no words and asserts that “When I speak of Filipino philosophy, I do not mean the
approach used by Leonardo Mercado and Florentino Timbreza, which I call the ‘cultural
approach’ or ‘Filipino ethnophilosophy’ in that they attempted to extract, as it were, the
philosophical underpinnings or presuppositions of a people’s culture as culled from their
languages, folksongs, folk literature, folk sayings, and so on.” The Making of a Filipino Philosopher,
63.
© 2019 Romualdo E. Abulad
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_25/abulad1_december2019.pdf
ISSN 1908-7330

28 PILOSOPIYANG PINOY
be in a position to make an objective and accurate judgment of ourselves. I
suggest that the best strategy is still not to indulge in any strategy at all, but
simply to philosophize as one is inspired to do, without the thought that how
one does it is the only way of doing Filipino philosophy. For, after all, as Quito
would often say during her time, philosophy knows neither gender nor
nationality, neither chronology nor religion. Her open-mindedness is
legendary. Let me quote her here lengthily, for it seems to me that this
philosopher, who was brightest light of her generation, can still be arguably
considered as unsurpassed in many ways. In her “Homage to Jean-Paul
Sartre,” she has this to say:
My guideline in the study of philosophy has always
been to render to every philosopher the widest possible
benevolence of interpretation … I have made openmindedness a sine qua non of philosophical research,
and I contend, as a matter of creed, that there is no
philosophical system that is completely wrong, hence to
be summarily condemned, nor is there one that is
completely right and therefore to be totally accepted.62
In “A New Concept of Philosophy,” she is unambiguous: “Philosophy should
have no color, no religious affiliation … Philosophy should be a free science
that seeks its own paths.”63 In writing “Three Women Philosophers,” she
aims “to prove that the mind has no sex or gender, and that sound thinking
can originate from anyone, male or female.”64
Perhaps the best articulation of Quito’s concept of philosophy is the
one she gave as her inaugural address in the University of Sto. Tomas for the
academic year 1967-68, part of which reads:
If I were to be asked to define philosophy, I must answer
that I cannot. Philosophy is undefinable, i.e., it knows no
limits just as the human mind knows no boundaries in
its search for the rational explanation of reality and of
man himself. No formula can ever exhaust the meaning
of philosophy: all speculations about it have their own
62 Emerita S. Quito, A Life of Philosophy: Festschrift in honor of Emerita S. Quito (Manila:
De La Salle University Press, 1990), 622. This festschrift contains all the works of Quito and
remains as the most monumental philosophical volume in the country. See also page 8, where
she contends that “there is no philosophical system that is completely wrong, hence to be
summarily condemned, nor is there one that is completely right and therefore to be totally
accepted.”
63 Ibid., 10.
64 Ibid., 651.
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value and truth. We can only delve into philosophy by
actually experiencing it. The best we can manage,
therefore, by way of an answer to the question of what
is philosophy is to give a philosophizing one:
Philosophy is a discipline where the questions are more
important than the answers and every answer becomes
a new question.65
This attitude of Quito is what explains her open-minded approach to
philosophy. For her, philosophy “is necessarily a never ending quest” as well
as “a private, personal one.”66 Thus, “answers cannot be formulated in articles
of faith” and are “never meant to be dogmatic or catechetical,” for they
always “leave a margin for dissension and interpretation.” 67 “Philosophy is
not a closed science where questions have been answered for all time,” Quito
says, “It should not stop the work of successive generations but should rather
encourage it by orienting itself towards the future.”68 She is of the opinion
that “until we learn to assume an open attitude in regard to new philosophical
doctrines, we have not yet arrived at philosophical maturity.” 69
The fecundity of such a philosophical stance is shown by Quito’s
intellectual flexibility. In the “Introduction” to her Festschrift I took note of
something which may be said to be in favor of her open and historically based
approach. “It is, in a word, Filipino. Whereas Indians naturally show
preference for Indian thought and Frenchmen for French thought, Filipinos
are prone to adjust easily to varied, even contradictory, schools of
philosophy.”70 I traced this historically to the fact that, culturally speaking,
unlike India or China (for example), we are a nation without solid tradition.
“Is this a state of affairs that one should deplore? Sure enough, we might
consider this predicament a weakness, but second thoughts could reveal it as
a blessing and a strength. Of all peoples, we are in the best position to start
anew from scratch, and in philosophy this could prove to be a fortune rather
than a curse,”71 I said.
Socrates is the philosopher’s philosopher mainly because he knows
that he does not know. This learned ignorance was applied to all classical
thought about two millennia later by René Descartes who smartly responded
to the skeptical climate of his time with his unrelenting methodic universal
Ibid., 7.
Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 8.
69 Ibid.
70 See Romualdo E. Abulad, Introduction to Quito, A Life of Philosophy: Festschrift in
honor of Emerita S. Quito.
71 Ibid.
65
66
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doubt. This was consciously repeated two thousand years thereafter by
Edmund Husserl who consciously preceded his phenomenology with the
universal epoche, all in an attempt to establish that crucial beginning which
would destine all succeeding knowledge as indubitably certain. Even that
philosophy, certain though it might be, continues to bear traces of that
presence
which
makes
contemporary
deconstruction
possible.
Postmodernism has at last found the key that would completely secure the
foundationless and groundless knowledge whose unpredictable insights are
boundless and limitless.
By his very nature, the Filipino is without roots. The anthropological
effort, which provides one major task of contemporary philosophy in our
country, must be pursued, but it remains true that, until now, the
archaeological findings have been somewhat ridiculously magnified,
revealing fossils that do not have72 too much substance yet. The worse about
the anthropological approach is that it tends to arrogate unto itself the truth
about the Filipino mind, thus excluding or at least debasing other so-called
merely expository, descriptive, or non-anthropological philosophies. And
these others are, so to speak, legion. Ateneo’s legendary preoccupation with
phenomenology and existentialism must have now produced a library that
includes such bright academics as Roque Ferriols, Ramon Reyes, Leo Garcia,
Manuel Dy, Tomas Rosario, Ranier Ibana, and Albert Alejo. The University
of Sto. Tomas and De La Salle University have seen an overlap of prestige in
the likes of Emerita S. Quito, Claro Ceniza, Alfredo Co, Paolo Bolaños, and
Florentino Timbreza. And let’s not demean our very own Cebuano
institution, the University of San Carlos, which has been the home of the
SVDs Leonardo Estioko, Quintin Terrenal, Florencio Lagura and Raymun
Festin, as well as contemporary non-SVDs like Amosa Velez, Rosario Espina
and Ryan Urbano. This list is far from complete and exhaustive, but only
because I am not cognizant of what’s going on everywhere, not even in the
other academic institutions, such as UP and Silliman. However, the likes of
the ones I’ve randomly mentioned would have to be excluded if the
anthropological approach would be declared as the sole legitimate method
for the creation of a Filipino philosophy. I would not go for such a
proposition; I’d prefer Quito’s prescription of open-mindedness.
It is with much ease that we understand the spirit of postmodernity
precisely because of our lack of rootedness, or perhaps more accurately the
meagerness of our roots. There is nothing to be ashamed of in the historical
fact that we do not have a tradition as immensely rich as, say, China and
India. We are not China or India, nor Greece or Rome, nor Germany or France,

72 Editor’s note: In the original manuscript, the author wrote, “with not” which we
have replaced here with “do not have” for clarity.
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nor England or Australia. We are not Africa, nor are we Spain or America.
This is the Philippines and all the facts about the Philippines belong to me,
even the fact of my own lack—the lack of a long history and a glorious
cultural heritage. The mistake is to dwell on this lack and do nothing about
it; that would make us either plain stupid or lazy, which we are not supposed
to be. The cue comes from the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, when he says:
“Existence precedes essence,” he means that, “man first of all exists,
encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself
afterwards.”73 The moment’s task assigned to a Filipino philosopher is one of
existential definition. If you don’t believe that there is such a thing as a
Filipino philosophy, then one thing I may ask you to do is gather all the
writings of the authors I have just named above, see for yourself how much
work has already been done, quantitatively, and then assess the intellectual
worth of its entirety, qualitatively.
You are asking, “Uso pa ba ang Pilosopiyang Pinoy?” I say, with all my
due respect to you, that the question is missing the point. Philosophy is not
at all about fads and fashions. In recent years, philosophy majors have
dramatically decreased in number. Just in June of this year, we saw our
undergraduates decline from about a hundred to just about seventy, which is
due to the closure or transfer of some of the formation houses in Cebu. One
or two congregations ceased sending their boys to us and instead have sent
them to the Rogationist Seminary, which we don’t consider a bad thing at all.
Not a few of the formators in that seminary have been formed by us in the
University of San Carlos, and it’s not a bad idea if they start using their
learned expertise to expand the possibilities for seminaries in the region. The
implication of this phenomenon for us in the University is simply that we
now have to re-design our concept of philosophy in a way that will cater
primarily to non-seminarians. Again, not a bad idea. Philosophy is not meant
only to prepare students for either the priesthood or the legal profession.
More and more, the relevance of philosophy is being recognized as
foundational for all disciplines, sacred or profane. The first department to
connect with us this academic year is the Biology Department, seeking to
evolve together with a course in Bioethics, both for their graduate and
undergraduate majors. Just a month ago, before the start of the current
semester, the Physics Department sent me an email asking us to meet with
their teachers in an effort to understand some rudiments of Philosophy of
Science. In January next the second batch of Chinese students from the
Mainland will arrive in our school to pursue a Ph.D. in Business
Management, and the College of Business and Entrepreneurship (which is

73 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. by Philip Mairet (London:
Methuen, 1948), 28.
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how they would like to call themselves in the future) has asked the
Philosophy Department to offer the first two modular classes, specifically
instructing us to do Philosophy of Man and Philosophy of Culture. Trends
like this are bound to set the trend for the re-designing of philosophy courses
in our time.
I shall tell you something more which, at first, will be hard for many
people to understand. We have decided in the University of San Carlos to
fuse the two Departments of Philosophy and Religious Education; now we
have just one Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies. The idea of
the merger is not new; it has been floating for many years, but habits, as they
say, die hard. We continue to be the premier university in these parts in so far
as philosophy is concerned, since we remain to be the only school here which
has a complete program of philosophy from the undergraduate to the Ph.D.
and we have enough of our share of doctors in the faculty. Why, then, fuse
with another department?
More than half of a century ago, in May 1959, an academic named
Charles P. Snow delivered an otherwise insignificant lecture in the halls of
Cambridge. Snow described what happened next in a ‘second look’ of it he
made in 1963:
According to precedent, the lecture was published, as a
paper-covered pamphlet, the day after it was delivered.
It received some editorial attention but, in the first
month, not many reviews. There was not, and could not
be, any advertising. Encounter published long extracts,
and these drew some comment. I had a number of
interesting private letters. That, I thought, was the end
of it.74
It did not turn out to be that way at all. “By the end of the first year I began
to feel uncontrollably like the sorcerer’s apprentice. Articles, references,
letters, blame, praise, were floating in—often from countries where I was
otherwise unknown … The literature has gone on accumulating at an
accelerating pace.”75 Today, who has not heard of C.P. Snow’s critique of the
‘two cultures’? “I intend something serious,” he said,
I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western
society is increasingly being split into two polar groups
… Literary intellectuals at one pole – at the other
74 C.P. Snow, “The Two Cultures: A Second Look (1963),” in The Two Cultures
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 53.
75 Ibid., 54.
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scientists, and as the most representative, the physical
scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual
incomprehension—sometimes (particularly among the
young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of
understanding.76
What follows is, as they say, history. The attempts to bridge cultures through
inter- and multi-disciplinarity is well known. Borders have cracked and walls
have crumbled, and the new time begins to call for the fusion of horizons.
Hegel once said of an idea whose time has come, that one cannot arrest it no
matter what obstacles stand in the way.
For the rest it is not difficult to see that our epoch is a
birth-time, and a period of transition. The spirit of man
has broken with the old order of things hitherto
prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in
the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past
and to set about its own transformation. 77
While the collapse of borders and the merger of horizons are taking place, the
two cultures proceed in a direction where the scientific edge seems to be
reducing the humanistic disciplines to an endangered species. Everybody is
seeking to quantify itself, measuring its capacity to be a science in terms of
mathematics and calculation. Formulas and statistics are taking the place of
purely descriptive studies, so that even what belongs to the human side of
things is now being forced to follow the mold of quantification. Psychology
now belongs to the social sciences, which continue to ape the methods of
mathematics and physics. The mechanization of knowledge gives rise to an
amazing world of science and technology, a blessing no doubt that owes itself
to the genius of man, but a curse too that is putting the humanities or liberal
arts, what the Germans call Geisteswissenchaften, on the sidelines.
Even philosophy, as well as to some extent theology, has important
proponents which are seriously pondering on aligning the spiritual
disciplines to science and measurement. Allow me to say that much of what
I have referred to as the anthropological approach to philosophy tends to lean
on this direction. This causes a deep divide between the two disciplines, the
naturalistic and the humanistic disciplines (Naturwissenschaften and
Geisteswissenschaften). Much of the latter has moved over to the empirical and
scientific side of the academe, so that what we now call the social sciences are

76
77

Snow, “The Rede Lecture (1959),” in The Two Cultures, 3.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, 75.
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no longer really within the sphere of the liberal or spiritual disciplines. In the
University of San Carlos, in particular, only philosophy and religion remain
as the bulwark of the humanities. Literature belongs to the Department of
Languages and Literature which is currently slight in literature and large in
linguistics, whereas linguistics is either grammar or a social science, thus
more akin to science than to the arts. The arts, on the other hand, are in the
hands not of the College of Arts and Sciences but of the College of
Architecture and Fine Arts, a competent and highly entrenched department
which is unwilling to get itself subjugated together with philosophy and
religion under the Humanities cluster. That leaves philosophy and religion
the only remaining stronghold of the spiritual sciences (Geisteswissenschaften),
which is the rationale for their having to work together and join hands
especially in the widespread mission of Ethics and Catholicity. This, Ethics
and Catholicity, is being strongly brought forward by the current leadership
of my University, and philosophy is certainly a major partner in this mission
or what we SVDs call prophetic dialogue.
Moreover, the government’s Philippine Main Education Highway
(PMEH) is now on the verge of implementation on account of global moves
to discredit nations with less than twelve years of basic education. There
seems to be no more doubt that two more years will be added before one can
go to college, after which a young candidate has the option to proceed either
to the academic university or to the vocational technical school. This move
will professionalize the college offerings and, in all likelihood, the current
practice of two years of general liberal education in college will go down to
the level of senior high school. There will be a lot of rethinking in higher
education and my suspicion is that our radical decision to collapse
philosophy and religious studies into one department will prove to be a
felicitous move that will facilitate the road for the other disciplines.
What all this amounts to is the futility of an exercise that fears for the
life of philosophy as a professional discipline in the future. One thing that we
should perhaps always keep in mind is that the death of philosophy is most
ably undertaken by no less than the ablest philosophers themselves, think
only of Socrates, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, the
empiricists John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume, Immanuel Kant,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig
Wittgenstein and the deconstructionists like Jacques Derrida and Jean
Baudrilliard. No other discipline faces its own fragility and possible mortality
more frontally than philosophy itself. There is no need to fear that we shall
not be relevant. If we ever become irrelevant, it’s no thanks to ourselves who
might not have been willing to do as expected of philosophers: lead the pack
to new spiritual frontiers coming from the uncertainties and challenges of the
present times.
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Philosophy continues to be the handmaid of religion, but not in so far
as it is being asked to assist in a formulaic and mechanical imitation of, say,
the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas. If it were only this, then religion
would have need not so much for philosophy as for an intellect keen enough
to literally commit to memory scholastic manuals for exact delivery at
baccalaureate exams. The importance of philosophy as a tool or organon is,
in fact, not limited to theological subjects but extends to all thinking in
general, which means to all disciplines. This is why all academic courses will
be impoverished, both formally and substantially, when not steeped in the
discipline of philosophy. In other words, all areas of knowledge and behavior
need philosophy as a fundamental discipline, without which they will lack in
either rigor or depth and will eventually wilt and collapse. Beyond all this
dirty work philosophy is asked to do on behalf of the existing sciences, it also
stands as a pure discipline on its own footing. What Kant, Heidegger and
Wittgenstein have accomplished could not have been done outside of pure
philosophy, whose speculative and practical results have brought about the
culture of postmodernity.
Filipino philosophy can extricate itself from global philosophy only
at its own expense. The Philippine Main Education Highway has been
conceived precisely in response to global requirements, thanks to
international accords like APEC, Washington and Bologna. Any isolationist
move on the part of Filipino philosophers will be destructive for its own
mission in an age and time which calls for linkages and encompassing
solutions. It is philosophy, one might say, which has brought the world to its
postmodern situation, and it is philosophy’s continuing task to guide
humanity in the direction where the spirit leads it. In all this, there is a
partnership between philosophy and religion which we should not try to
frustrate. The secular Spirit is basically only the other side of the mystical
Spirit, in the same way that Spinoza’s natura naturans and natura naturata are
identical.
Department of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines
Loyola School of Theology, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Divine Word Mission Seminary (Christ the King Mission Seminary), Philippines
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